000070827 001__ 70827
000070827 005__ 20190709135429.0
000070827 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1016/j.scitotenv.2017.05.226
000070827 0248_ $$2sideral$$a98850
000070827 037__ $$aART-2017-98850
000070827 041__ $$aeng
000070827 100__ $$0(orcid)0000-0003-3552-1810$$aMartínez, Yolanda$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza
000070827 245__ $$aEfficiency and acceptance of new water allocation rules - The case of an agricultural water users association
000070827 260__ $$c2017
000070827 5060_ $$aAccess copy available to the general public$$fUnrestricted
000070827 5203_ $$aWater scarcity is one of the major environmental problems in Southern Europe. High levels of water stress and increasing frequency of droughts, along with a greater environmental protection, make it necessary to design water management strategies that are allocative efficient and balance supply and demand. When functioning markets cannot be developed, the allocation rules proposed in the literature of social choice have been recognized as a suitable alternative. However, the application of new water allocation rules can be impaired by a lack of acceptance and implementation problems. This paper examines these obstacles for the case of an agricultural water users association (WUA), situated in the basin of the River Ebro, in relation to the governance structure and collective decision rule of the WUA. It analyzes the extent to which the gains and losses of the farmers affect their acceptance, and examines conditions for building agreements with side payments that provide incentives for the majority of the farmers to form part of a possible agreement. The results show that the uniform and sequential rules improve the allocative efficiency under normal conditions compared to the status quo and the sequential rule even in the case of droughts. In the presence of side payments this rule is likely to be accepted and has only an insignificant impact on distributional inequality.
000070827 536__ $$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/INIA/RTA2014-00050-00-00$$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MINECO/ECO2016-75927-R
000070827 540__ $$9info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess$$aby-nc-nd$$uhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
000070827 590__ $$a4.61$$b2017
000070827 591__ $$aENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES$$b27 / 241 = 0.112$$c2017$$dQ1$$eT1
000070827 592__ $$a1.546$$b2017
000070827 593__ $$aEnvironmental Chemistry$$c2017$$dQ1
000070827 593__ $$aWaste Management and Disposal$$c2017$$dQ1
000070827 593__ $$aPollution$$c2017$$dQ1
000070827 593__ $$aEnvironmental Engineering$$c2017$$dQ1
000070827 655_4 $$ainfo:eu-repo/semantics/article$$vinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
000070827 700__ $$aGoetz, Renan
000070827 700__ $$aXabadía, Angels
000070827 7102_ $$14000$$2415$$aUniversidad de Zaragoza$$bDpto. Análisis Económico$$cÁrea Fund. Análisis Económico
000070827 773__ $$g601-602 (2017), 614-625$$pSci. total environ.$$tScience of the Total Environment$$x0048-9697
000070827 8564_ $$s384005$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/70827/files/texto_completo.pdf$$yPostprint
000070827 8564_ $$s63641$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/70827/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon$$xicon$$yPostprint
000070827 909CO $$ooai:zaguan.unizar.es:70827$$particulos$$pdriver
000070827 951__ $$a2019-07-09-11:31:08
000070827 980__ $$aARTICLE