El derecho a decidir y el principio democrático
Resumen: After having decided the objective of independence, the political parties in favour of this objective had to find a way how to articulate their aspirations. Since there is no legal way within the national or international law, the independence movement based their demands in the democratic principle by building the so-called right to decide. However this right to decide means to limit the democratic principle to a single electoral act, with unilaterally established rules and outside the existing legal framework. In this article we try to disprove both the supposed opposition between the rule of law and the democratic principle, as well as the supposed democratic spirit of the right to decide. Along with this, we will argue that it is impossible to constitutionalise the right of self-determination. The right of self-determination is opposed to the essence of any constitutional order, moreover the difficulties of setting the conditions in order to implement this right, and particularly, the definition of the subject, makes the application impossible.
Idioma: Español
Año: 2016
Publicado en: Teoría y realidad constitucional 37, 1 (2016), 477-497
ISSN: 1139-5583

Originalmente disponible en: Texto completo de la revista

Tipo y forma: Article (Published version)
Área (Departamento): Derecho Constitucional (Departamento de Derecho Público)

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